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Abstract  
Technologies have been introduced that allow companies to track consumer browsing online. 
Behavioral advertising, also referred to as behavioral targeting, is a method of collecting 
consumer information based on online behavior.  From the information collected, by an 
advertiser, a detailed consumer profile can be created.  The consumer profile is designed to 
provide advertisers with a more accurate picture of the kinds of services or products that a 
group of users, or a specific user, might be interested in purchasing.  To better determine 
consumer preferences, tracking applications may record consumer purchases on a specific 
company’s website, or across multiple websites, including competitor’s websites.  
 
The scope of the information collected, in many cases, is much broader than understood by 
the consumer.  The legality of behavioral advertising and the use of tracking applications in 
the US and the EU often rest on consent provided by consumers.
1
  Disclosure of the 
applications, and the consent sought are generally facilitated by contract, privacy policies, 
term of use agreements, or end user agreements.  Recent regulatory agency decisions in the 
EU and the US suggest that the consent provided by consumers may be questionable as terms 
and conditions of tracking applications are presented in a way that often makes them difficult 
for the consumer to understand or appreciate.  This thesis will consider those concerns; 
discuss policy points raised, and provide a comparison of the regulatory systems in the US 
and the EU.  The contracting methods and terms used to incorporate or facilitate these 
regulatory policies will also be considered.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 Barnes, Wayne. RETHINKING SPYWARE: QUESTIONING THE PROPRIETY OF CONTRACTUAL 
CONSENT TO ONLINE SURVEILLANCE, 39 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1545, 1547 (2006) (arguing that too little 
debate has taken place regarding a consumers right to consent to tracking applications which may have serious 
privacy consequences). 
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1 Introduction 
Changes in technology have made a level of consumer surveillance possible that once only 
existed in science fiction.  In the early days of the Internet, users had the ability to remain 
largely anonymous with their online browsing habits.  This has changed.  The adage of the 
1990s, "nobody knows you are a dog on the Internet,"
2
 no longer rings true.  As stated by one 
commentator "[o]n the new targeted Internet, they now know what kind of dog you are, your 
favorite leash color, the last time you had fleas and the date you were neutered."
3
  The advent 
of new technologies, coupled with a reduction in the cost of online surveillance, has greatly 
increased the possibilities for data collection and identification of users online.
4
   
Consideration of the role played by behavioral advertising technologies in electronic 
commerce is important on both a practical and a normative level.  From a practical standpoint, 
behavioral advertising has many economic benefits, including a means of funding for many 
startup web based companies.  However, behavioral advertising may also have potentially 
negative implications for consumer privacy.  On a normative level, exceptions in regulatory 
acts for consumer consent, provided by contract, make prohibitions or regulations of 
technologies difficult to enforce.  The reality that consumers often waive substantial rights 
when they enter into contracts, or other agreements, is not a new concept.  In the United 
States (US), consumers have long been able to bargain away substantial rights when accepting 
contract terms.  For Americans, this includes their right to access local courts, the right to 
apply local law, and the flexibility to assume substantial risks, including bodily harm, when 
entering into a contract.
5
   
In the European Union (EU), the experience for consumers has been different.  EU member 
states have generally subscribed to a higher level of consumer protection and legislated that 
                                                 
2
 Gindin, Susan E., NOBODY READS YOUR PRIVACY POLICY OR ONLINE CONTRACT?  LESSONS 
LEARNED AND QUESTIONS RAISED BY THE FTC'S ACTION AGAINST SEARS.  8 Nw. J. Tech. & 
Intell. Prop. 1, 11 (2009) (providing comparison of captions and citing Steiner, Peter; published by The New 
Yorker on July 5, 1993 (cartoon caption)). 
3
 Gindin, at 66 (2009) (Providing comparison of  cartoon captions). 
4
 Lessing, Lawrence, CODE 2.0, Basic Books, at 234 (2006). 
5
 See e.g. Caspi v. Microsoft Network, L.L.C., 323 N.J. Super. 118, 732 A.2d 528 (App. Div. 1999). 
2 
 
some rights are not derogable in consumer contracts.
6
  Nevertheless, consumers in the EU 
also face challenges to their privacy from behavioral advertising technologies.  In this thesis I 
will consider some of the challenges posed by behavioral advertising and the role played by 
contracts and other agreements used to legitimize targeting practices.  I will also consider the 
regulatory approaches taken in the US and the EU as they relate to behavioral advertising.  
1.1 Legal questions and problems considered 
I will consider legal questions regarding the role of contract terms, and other agreements, as 
the means of legitimizing behavioral advertising applications or practices.  Specifically, I will 
consider whether terms, which state that a consumer consents to having behavioral 
advertising technologies installed on their computer are presented in manner that consumers 
are able to understand and consent to.    
I will also compare the current systems in place to protect the privacy of consumers in the US 
and the EU.  I will then consider this question from the view of both contract and data 
protection law.  Further, I will discuss whether the systems in place provide sufficient 
consumer protection, either contractually or in regard to data protection, as the regulations 
relate to data collection via behavioral advertising technologies.  I will also consider whether 
consumers have adequate causes of action for breaches of privacy rights, either by way of 
contract, or other statutory regulation.  Specifically, what are the advantages of the remedies 
available in either the US or EU systems?  The more direct question which will be considered 
is whether the US system of ―self-regulation‖ provides consumers with adequate protections.   
Contracts, and other agreements, as they relate to behavioral advertising applications, will be 
the central discussion point of this thesis.  Whether consumer consent, obtained via electronic 
contract or other agreement provides a sufficient legal basis to support behavioral advertising 
will be discussed.  Specifically, I will consider the role of contract terms, provided in standard 
form contracts, as they relate to privacy policies, end user license agreements, and terms of 
use policies.    
                                                 
6
 See Directive 93/13/EEC (―Unfair Terms Directive‖) (limiting waivers of consumer rights including a 
consumer's right to go to court).  Note: Full citations to all directives are available in the ‖References‖ section 
Infra. 
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1.2 Overview of chapters 
The first chapter of this thesis consists of an introduction to the topic, legal questions 
considered, and the definitions of the core concepts. 
The second chapter will consider the online incorporation of contract terms and other 
agreements.  One of the central issues in this work will be to determine notice and consent 
requirements for the validity of contracts supporting behavior advertising.  In this chapter I 
will consider the presentation of contract terms to consumers and the method of notice 
provided.  I will specifically consider the rights consumers waive when they are entering into 
contracts or other online agreements.  Finally, the second chapter will consider a recent 
regulatory action in the US, the case of Sears Inc, and discuss the answers that case may 
provide. 
The third chapter will consider behavioral advertising and the legal issues surrounding the 
technology.  I will provide brief definitions of the technology and define the parties involved.  
I will also consider current regulation in the US and the EU as well as recent actions taken by 
regulators.   
1.3 Legal method 
The primarily focus of this thesis will be on regulation of behavioral advertising in the US and 
the EU.  Therefore, I will consider available legislation governing behavioral advertising, 
largely from those jurisdictions.  Cases, articles, and legal perspectives will be largely drawn 
from the US and the EU.  Foundational information, as well as the current structure of 
electronic contracts in the EU and US, will be discussed.  Examples from outside the US and 
the EU will be considered where relevant.  Codes or principles of self-regulation for 
behavioral advertising will also be considered.
7
    
 
Additional focus will be placed on recent regulatory decisions in the US and the EU.  
Decisions in the US come largely from the Federal Trade Commission, a US regulatory 
                                                 
7
 Network Advertising Initiative (NAI)(Providing voluntary standards for companies to 
follow)(http://www.networkadvertising.org/about/.). 
 
4 
 
agency (hereinafter "FTC").
8
  In the EU, decisions of the Article 29 Working Party 
(hereinafter ―Working Party‖) will be used for comparative purposes.  The Working Party is 
made up of a board of representatives comprised of supervisory authorities designated by 
each member state.
9
  In the EU, contracts will also be evaluated through the lens of various 
directives, regulatory decisions, and court actions.  In the US, I will discuss court actions, the 
United States Code (―U.S.C‖), the Uniform Commercial Code (―U.C.C.‖), and model laws.  
Existing consumer legislation will be considered as a point of comparison between the US 
and the EU.  
1.4 Definitions and core concepts 
The need for new electronic commerce regulations have left legislators and regulators with 
considerable challenges in creating usable definitions that are able to adapt to changes in 
technology.  Definitions must be specific enough that they are relevant and applicable to the 
technical concepts they represent.  However, they must also remain vague and flexible 
enough that they do not immediately become outdated.  Therefore, drafters must attempt to 
"future proof" and create legal definitions that will not become immediately obsolete.  Below 
are some definitions that are applicable to the core concepts discussed in this thesis.  
1.4.1 Electronic commerce 
I will specify when legislation provides a specific definition for electronic commerce, which 
is pertinent in a legislative act or directive.  In the absence of a specific definition, I will use 
the more general definition of ―[t]he practices of buying and selling goods and services 
through online consumer services on the Internet.‖10   The use of electronic means to carry out 
essential contracting functions is a hallmark of electronic contracting.
11
  Electronic commerce 
                                                 
8
 See Infra §1.4.3. "Behavioral advertising" 
9
 Directive on data protection 95/46/EC Art. 30(1)(hereinafter ―DPD‖).   
10
 Black's Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009). 
11
 Id. Discussing electronic data interchange (EDI), electronic mail (e-mail), electronic fund transfers as 
examples of electronic commerce systems. 
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is often used in a generic sense to describe a wide range of systems used to carry out 
transactions.
12
  
1.4.2 Electronic contract 
The term "electronic contract" does not have a standard or universal definition.
13
  In 
legislation, the term is often defined for the purpose of a specific legal code or regulation.  An 
inclusive definition defines an electronic contract as "...the common will of the parties to 
create a legal phenomenon that is made, produced or controlled by means of electronics."
14
  
This definition is inclusive and properly lays out the common thread through most online 
contractual agreements, that is, their electronic character.  
In the EU, there is no uniform definition for electronic contract.
15
  Existing definitions are 
found in various instruments regulating electronic commerce, for example, the electronic 
commerce directive (hereinafter ―ECD‖).16  In the EU, a ―distance contract‖ has been defined 
as ―…any contract concerning goods or services between a supplier and a consumer under an 
organized distance sales scheme run by the supplier, who, for the purposes of the contract, 
makes exclusive use of one or more means of distance communication up to and including the 
moment at which the contract is concluded.‖17  This definition is helpful.  However, it is 
broad enough to include contracts that are not completed online or by electronic means.   
A general US definition of electronic contract is ―any type of contract formed in the course of 
electronic commerce by (1) the interaction of two or more individuals using electronic means, 
such as e-mail, (2) the interaction of an individual with an electronic agent, such as a 
computer program, or (3) the interaction of at least two electronic agents that are programmed 
                                                 
12
 Pastukhov, Oleksandr.  INTERNATIONAL TAXATION OF INCOME DERIVED FROM ELECTRONIC 
COMMERCE: CURRENT PROBLEMS AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS, Tech. L. 310, 313  (2006). 
13
 Nuth, Maryke Silalahi, Electronic commerce Contracting: The Effective Formation of Online Contracts. At 
43-44 (Oslo 2010).  
14
 Nuth, at 45. (emphasis added). 
15
 HÖrnle, Riefa, The Changing Face of Electronic Consumer Contracts, LAW AND THE INTERNET.  At 93 
(2009). 
 
16
 Id.   
17
 Directive 97/7/EC protection of consumers in respect of distance contracts (hereinafter ―DSD‖). 
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to recognize the existence of a contract.‖18  A definition may be dispositive as to whether a 
certain law is applicable.  If that is the case, the definition will be provided.   
1.4.3 Behavioral Advertising 
Behavioral advertising utilizes tracking technologies that are constantly changing.  Therefore, 
the terms require a definition that is flexible and future proof.
19
  The Working Party defines 
behavioral advertising as:  
 
Advertising that is based on the observation of the behavior of individuals over time.   
Behavioral advertising seeks to study the characteristics of this behavior through their 
actions (repeated site visits, interactions, keywords, online content production, etc.) in 
order to develop a specific profile and thus provide data subjects with advertisements 
tailored to match their inferred interests.
20
   
  
The FTC is charged with consumer protection and regulating unfair commercial practices in 
the US, including those taking place online.
21
  Behavioral advertising is defined by the FTC 
as "[t]he tracking of a consumer's online activities over time, including the searches the 
consumer has conducted, the web pages visited, and the content viewed in order to deliver 
advertising targeted to the individual consumer's interests."
22
 In available literature, the terms 
behavioral advertising and behavioral tracking are used in relation to the same objectives, 
namely, creating user profiles based on online browsing or use. 
23
 In this article the term 
―behavioral advertising‖ is used as it is more consistent with recent enforcement decisions.  
Behavioral advertising incorporates the tracking and profiling systems utilized.  In addition, it 
                                                 
18
 Black's Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009). 
19
 Directive 2002/58/EC (hereinafter ―ECD‖) applies to websites but is not applicable to data messages, or 
emails, as electronic contracts.   
20
 Art. 29 WP Opinion 2/2010 (adopted on 22 June 2010)(hereinafter ―WP Opinion2/2010‖).   
21
 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58. 
22
 Gindin, Susan E., at 11 (2009) (Citing FED. TRADE COMM'N, FTC STAFF REPORT: SELF-
REGULATORY PRINCIPLES FOR ONLINE BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING 42 (2009), available at http:// 
www.ftc.gov/os/2009/02/P085400behavadreport.pdf.)). 
 
23
 Berger, Dustin D., BALANCING CONSUMER PRIVACY WITH BEHAVIORAL TARGETING. Santa 
Clara Computer and High Technology Law Journal (April 1, 2010). Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1693029) 
7 
 
also includes the monitory aspect, advertising dollars, which is the driving force behind the 
development and deployment of targeting technologies and profiling systems. 
1.4.4 Privacy 
In this article references will be made to privacy. Privacy is an amorphous concept that is 
difficult to define.
24
  In this work the term privacy will consider what has been deemed 
―informational privacy,‖ the individual’s right to control what is known about them.25  If a 
more specific definition is applicable, it will be noted in the applicable section. 
 
                                                 
24
 See e.g. Bygrave, LA: DATA PROTECTION LAW: APPROACHING ITS RATIONALE, LOGIC AND LIMITS (The 
Hague/London/New York: Kluwer Law International) at 4 (2002)(Providing a framework for defining privacy). 
25
 Edward, Lilian; Privacy and Data Protection Online: the laws that Don`t work? LAW AND THE INTERNET. at 
445 (2009). 
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2 Online incorporation of Terms 
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I will discuss incorporation of online contract terms as the concept relates to 
behavioral advertising.  I will also consider how behavioral advertising terms are presented to 
consumers, methods of acceptance, and the role the terms play in providing legitimacy to 
behavioral advertising applications.  Discussion regarding a consumer's opportunity to review 
terms, disclosure of terms, and standard of notice will also be considered.  This will require a 
comparison of various methods of online acceptance including, ―clickwrap‖ and 
―browsewrap,‖ agreements.   
The legal validity of behavioral advertising applications is often predicated on consent.
26
  
Therefore, before behavioral advertising technologies can be lawfully deployed, consent must 
be obtained from the consumer.
27
 Behavioral advertisers often use the terms of online 
contracts, privacy policies, terms of use agreements, or end user license agreements as the 
method of presenting the terms.  Whether they realize it or not, when consumers click a 
button, download a program, or browse a website, they may assent to terms in the agreement 
and provide the requisite consent for the tracking of their online activity.
28
     
In this chapter, I will also discuss the incorporation of terms and the general system of online 
contracting.  First, I will consider the presentation of online agreements as standard term 
contracts.  This will include a discussion of both the bargaining process involved and the 
methods of presentation.  Second, I will discuss the common methods wherein behavioral 
advertisers incorporate terms, namely, privacy policies, term of use agreements, or end user 
                                                 
26
 Barnes, Wayne; RETHINKING SPYWARE: QUESTIONING THE PROPRIETY OF CONTRACTUAL 
CONSENT TO ONLINE SURVEILLANCE, 39 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1545, 1547 (2006).  
27
 Id. As opposed to spyware, which is deployed without consent.  
28
 Wilson, Emma, DOUGLAS v. TALK AMERICA: MAKING THE CASE FOR PROPER NOTICE, 45 Idaho 
L. Rev. 479, 496 (2009).  However, ―…it is not enough that the terms can be found somewhere; the terms also 
must be presented in such a way that they can be found by the reasonable user.‖ Hartzog,  at 406 (2010). 
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agreements.  Third, I will demonstrate the concepts of contracting discussed in this chapter 
using a recent case from the US as an example. 
2.2 Online agreements: adaptations 
Consumers and non-professional parties enter into electronic contracts and other agreements 
on a daily basis.
29
  In the US, the active number of home Internet users is over 148 million.
30
  
In Europe, the amount has been estimated at over 170 million.
31
  As a result of increased 
consumer Internet usage, a greater number of business-to-consumer (B2C) transactions are 
taking place in addition to the more traditional business-to-business (B2B) transactions.
32
  
The substantial increase in B2C contracts online has resulted in the weaker party, consumers, 
bargaining and conducting business on an international stage.  Therefore, in an attempt to 
provide adequate protections for the weaker party, legislative action has been taken in the EU 
to protect consumers.  The EU directives currently in place to protect consumers include the 
Unfair Terms Directive the Misleading and Comparative advertising Directive, and the Unfair 
Commercial Practices Directive.
 33
 In the US, the Uniform Computer Information Transaction 
Act (UCITA) provides a remedy for unfair terms, as they relate to transactions in computer 
information.
34
  However, the UCITA has only been adopted in two US jurisdictions; 
therefore, its application is limited.    
 
 
 
 
                                                 
29
 HÖrnle, Riefa, The Changing Face of Electronic Consumer Contracts, Law and the Internet.  Page 90 (2009).  
Andrew Hotaling, PROTECTING PERSONALLY IDENTIFYING INFORMATION ON THE INTERNET: 
NOTICE AND CONSENT IN THE AGE OF BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING, 16 COMMLAW 
CONSPECTUS 529, 529 (2008). 
31
 Kierkegaard, Sylvia Mercado, ELECTRONIC CONTRACT FORMATION: U.S. AND EU PERSPECTIVES, 
3 Shidler J. L. Com. & Tech. 12, Page 4 (2007). 
32
 Id. A greater number of consumer-to-consumer (C2C) transactions are also taking place. 
33
 93/13/EEC; 97/55/EC; 2005/29/EC; respectively.  A directive 2008/0196, on consumer rights, is forthcoming. 
34
 UCITA §111 (2002).  
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2.3 Standard terms in online agreements 
In the US, consumers entering into online contracts or other agreements are often presented 
with standard terms on a ―take-it-or-leave-it-basis.‖35  Standard term contracts do not allow 
consumers to negotiate terms they may not agree with.
36
  If consumers wish to purchase a 
product or utilize a service, they must accept the terms presented to them as a whole.
37
  It has 
been estimated that 99% of contractual agreements governing consumer purchases are 
presented in standard form.
38
  Although standard form contracts are often criticized by 
consumer rights advocates based on the one-sided character of the agreements, from a 
commercial perspective, they are often considered essential.
39
  If all contracts required 
individual negotiation, the speed of contracting would decrease while the cost of contracting 
would substantially increase.
40
  It is therefore clear that standard form contracting is not going 
away in the online age.
41
   
As a result of digital technology, an exhaustive list of terms can be provided to a consumer at 
very little expense.  However, consumer protection remains an important issue, regardless of 
any real or perceived economic inefficacy it may present.
42
  For most consumers, the 
proposition of refusing to enter into a standard term agreement is unrealistic.  Doing so may 
limit consumer access to modern necessities like credit cards, banking, and communications 
services.  While the number of agreements consumers enter into continues to rise, the risks 
associated with ―blindly accepting‖ online privacy notices or contract terms have also 
                                                 
35
 Hillman, Robert A. & Rachlinski, Jeffrey J.; STANDARD-FORM CONTRACTING IN THE ELECTRONIC 
AGE, 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 429, 437-439 (2002).   
36
 Gindin, Susan E., at 36 (2009). 
 
37
 Definition of ―consumer‖ is not uniform in the EU.  See 97/7/EC Art. 2(a), 93/13/ECArt. 2(b).  See also 
97/7/EC Art. 2(a).  
38
 Wilson, Emma, at 483-84 (2009). 
39
 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 211 cmt. a. (1979).  
40
 Id.  
41
 Alces and Greenfield. THEY CAN DO WHAT!? LIMITATIONS ON THE USE OF CHANGE-OF-TERMS 
CLAUSES, 26 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 1099 ¶ 1102-06 (2010)(Arguing that ―the context of consumer transactions, 
especially, they [contracts of adhesion] are nearly universal.‖). 
42
 Pursuant to ECD 2002/58/EC Art. 10(2), the directive is applicable to contracts not formed by individual 
negotiation.  
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increased.
43
  Contract terms presented are often ―long, detailed, full of legal jargon, about 
remote risks, and one-sided.‖44  Online contract terms may also require that a consumer waive 
substantial privacy rights, agree to restrictive terms of use, and acquiesce to licensing terms 
presented by a third-party.
45
  Furthermore, the rights waived by a consumer may vary 
considerably, depending on the agreement.  What is allowed or will be enforceable in a 
standard agreement also varies between the EU and the US.
46
 
It is, therefore, important for the consumer to consider the substance of the contractual terms 
being presented before agreeing to them.  In the next section, I will discuss how the substance 
of the terms are often disclosed or presented to consumers.  An examination of the varied 
methods by which terms are disclosed provides some explanation as to why consumers are 
willing to enter into what are arguably such one-side agreements. 
2.4 Presentation and disclosure of contract terms 
As stated in the previous section, the substantive terms of the agreements consumers enter 
into are often on a standard form basis.  Although the terms of the agreement may be 
standard, the methods of presenting and disclosing the terms to the consumer vary depending 
on jurisdiction and agreement type.  Further, I will also explore some of the reasons terms 
presented in online contracts are difficult for consumers to understand or appreciate.  I will 
also discuss the different approaches taken in the US and the EU in accepting contractual 
terms, and how they relate to behavioral advertising.    
 
General contract principles require that before contractual terms may be imposed, they must 
be incorporated into the document.
47
  Legal systems in both the EU and the US have made 
                                                 
43
 Gindin, Susan E., at 13 (2009). 
44
 Id.  
45
 Id. 
46
 Winn and Webber, at 228 (2006)(Maintaining that ―U.S. Internet businesses that target consumers in Europe 
need to be aware that standard form contracts that work well in the U.S. may be unenforceable in the EU.‖). 
47
 HÖrnle, Riefa, at 109 (2010). 
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accommodations for electronic contracting.
48
  However, business practices and legal 
standards continue to vary considerably between the US and the EU.  Traditionally, by 
signing a document, a consumer was bound by the terms contained therein. In the US, the law 
―presupposes a consumer's duty to read all terms in a contract, with the concomitant effect 
that the consumer is thereby bound by such terms.‖49  As a result, terms provided in an 
agreement allowing for behavioral advertising are generally valid, absent surprise or level of 
unfairness wherein they are declared void for public policy reasons.
50
  In the online context 
what has been presented to a consumer, or should be considered part of the agreement, is not 
always clear.  Online terms are often presented in a manner that requires the consumer to look 
outside of the immediate agreement in order to determine all the terms they are accepting or 
which are included in the agreement.  A consumer entering into an electronic contract may be 
required to visit multiple websites of follow multiple links in order to determine what terms 
are applicable to the agreement.  The presentation of online terms often makes it difficult for 
the consumer to review them prior to entering into an agreement and accepting them.
51
   What 
constitutes a proper or legal presentation of contract terms online may vary by jurisdiction.
52
     
 
In addition to entering an agreement by online signature, there are several methods for 
electronic acceptance including "browsewrap", "web-wrap", and "clickwrap."
53
  The US and 
the EU have taken different approaches in accepting or rejecting these methods.  Below the 
methods of accepting terms and entering into contracts will be considered. 
 
                                                 
48
 In the US, Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act (―E-Sign‖) in 2000.  Pub. L. 106-229, 
114 Stat. 464 (2000) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § § 7001-7006, 7021, 7031); Uniform Computer Information 
Transaction Act (2002); Uniform Electronic Transaction Act (1999).  In the EU, see the ECD.  See also Murray, 
at. 72-73 (2005). 
49
 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 211(3) (emphasis added).  Barnes, TOWARD A FAIRER MODEL OF 
CONSUMER ASSENT TO STANDARD FORM CONTRACTS: IN DEFENSE OF RESTATEMENT 
SECTION 211(3), 82 WASH. L. REV. 227, 228 (2007). 
50
 Barnes, Wayne. RETHINKING SPYWARE: QUESTIONING THE PROPRIETY OF CONTRACTUAL 
CONSENT TO ONLINE SURVEILLANCE, 39 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1545, 1551 (2006).   
51
 Id. 
52
 See e.g. Grierson, 106 A.L.R.5th 309 § 2(a) (2003). 
53
 HÖrnle, Riefa at 110 (2009). 
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2.4.1 Browsewrap acceptance 
In the "browsewrap" method of acceptance, contract terms are provided to a consumer on a 
webpage, which is generally accessible by hyperlink.
54
  Browsewrap agreements often 
provide that ―any additional browsing past the homepage constitutes acceptance of proposed 
terms located on the Web site.‖55  Although the terms are available if the consumer wishes to 
access them, there is no requirement that the consumer takes an affirmative step signifying 
that she has read the agreement.
56
  If the terms are displayed before the consumer assents to 
the agreement, they may be binding depending on the jurisdiction.  Assent may vary by 
circumstance, but might include downloading software, purchasing a product, or even 
viewing a webpage.
57
  In the case of behavioral advertising, the terms applicable to the 
tracking application may be presented as part of a separate privacy policy, which is available 
by browsewrap or web-wrap before the agreement is completed, but is not included as a term 
in the central or ―clickwrap‖ contract.  The consumer may read the privacy policy if they 
wish, but they are not generally required to do so in order to access the service or purchase the 
product.  However, to bind the consumer, some notice must be provided, as ―a party cannot 
assent to terms he has no reason to know exist.‖58   
 
In the EU, it has been deemed an unlikely prospect that simply browsing a website provides 
reasonable notice of contract terms.
59
  Therefore, consumer contracts presented by the 
browsewrap method will not generally be enforceable in the EU.  In the US, Courts have 
taken different approaches in determining whether these agreements are enforceable.
60
  
Although browsewrap terms have received some acceptance in the US, courts have been 
somewhat inconsistent their application in practice.  In the cases that follow, it is clear that US 
                                                 
54
 Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 29-30 (2d Cir. 2002). 
55
 Hartzog, Woodrow,  THE NEW PRICE TO PLAY: ARE PASSIVE ONLINE MEDIA USERS BOUND BY 
TERMS OF USE? 15 Comm. L. & Pol'y 405, 406 (2010). 
56
 Id.  
57
 Wilson, at 491 (2010). 
58
 Id. at 492 (2010) (Quoting Douglas, 495 F.3d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 2007)). 
59
 HÖrnle, Riefa at 110 (2009). 
60
 Kunz, Christina L. et al., BROWSEWRAP AGREEMENTS: VALIDITY OF IMPLIED ASSENT IN 
ELECTRONIC FORM AGREEMENTS, 59 Bus. Law. 279, 304-05 (2003). 
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courts place more weight on whether notice was provided before acceptance, rather than the 
method of display.  As such, browsewrap terms will not always fail as a method of 
procurement. 
 
In the case of Williams v. America Online, Inc., the US court determined that a forum 
selection clause was not applicable in the agreement because assent to the terms was required 
only after a consumer downloaded the product.
61
  In Williams, the consumer did not have the 
ability to consider or review the document until after the agreement had been accepted.
62
  As 
a result, the court deemed that the agreement was not enforceable against the consumer.  The 
opportunity to review a document before being bound and provide ―some manifestation of 
assent,‖ as well as the ability to stop the agreement if the consumer does not agree, are central 
aspects of a valid browsewrap agreement.
63
  In the leading US case on the matter, Specht v. 
Netscape Communications Corp., the Court applied similar logic to that in the Williams case 
and stated that "a consumer's clicking on a download button does not communicate assent to 
contractual terms, if the offer did not make clear to the consumer that clicking on the 
download button would signify assent to those terms."
64
 In that case, the end user license 
agreement (EULA) was not available to the consumer until after the download had been 
completed, thus, it provided no opportunity for review.
65
  The Specht Court provided that the 
―bare act of downloading the software did not unambiguously manifest assent to the 
arbitration provision contained in the license terms."
66
   In its decision, the Specht Court 
determined that "reasonable notice of the license terms" was not provided.
67
  
 
                                                 
61
 Williams v. Am. Online, Inc., WL 135825 at *1 (Mass. Super. Ct. Feb. 8, 2001). 
62
 Id. 
63
 Oakley, at. 1054 (2010). 
64
 306 F.3d 17, 21 (2d Cir. 2002) (emphasis added). See also SoftMan Prods. Co. v. Adobe Sys. Inc., 171 F. 
Supp. 2d 1075 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (holding browsewrap agreement provided insufficient notice).  
65
 306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002). 
66
 Id. at 40. 
67
 Id. at 29. Stating that "[m]utual manifestation of assent, whether by written or spoken word or by conduct, is 
touchstone of contract." 
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However, in another US case, Register.com v. Verio, Inc., a different result was reached by a 
federal district Court.
68
  In that case, the Verio Court held where terms were clearly posted on 
a website, they were enforceable against a user even if the user never affirmatively clicked on 
an ―I accept button.‖69  Similarly, in the case of Ticketmaster Corp v. Tickets.com, notice 
provided on a webpage was sufficient to bind a consumer to the terms presented, even without 
an affirmative act of agreement on behalf of the consumer.
70
  In the US, when considering 
enforceability of terms, courts put the greatest weight on the opportunity of the consumer has 
to review the terms before entering the agreement rather than the method by which the terms 
are delivered.  Although there certainly may be some connection, that is, some methods of 
presentation make it easier for consumers to review the substance of the terms governing the 
agreement. 
 
As demonstrated by the above case law, terms on a website which a consumer may not have 
affirmatively agreed to, may still be binding.
71
  In the case of browsewrap agreements, US 
courts seem to be willing to accept that notice has been sufficiently given where the terms, or 
the ability to access the terms is present.  In the behavioral advertising context, agreements 
presented by Browsewrap will generally be considered binding in the US, as long as the 
information regarding the application is provided prior to consumer acceptance.   
2.4.2 Clickwrap acceptance 
Clickwrap agreements are often considered to be the best method of providing notice to 
consumers and creating binding contracts.
72
  As the draft of the ALI Principles of the Law of 
Software Contracts suggests, a fair assessment of the cases is that a click-through interface is 
a safe harbor of enforceability beyond which websites stray at their own peril."
73
 With 
―clickwrap technology‖ contract terms are presented to the consumer, and she must take an 
                                                 
68
 126 F. Supp. 2d 238, 248 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
69
 Id. 
70
 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12987, (C.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2000). 
71
 Hartzog, at 407-08 (2010)(citing Burcham v. Expedia, 2009 WL 586513 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 6, 2009)). 
72
 Id. at 993. 
73
 Mann, at 993 (2008). 
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affirmative step to accept the terms in order to complete a transaction.  The assent provided 
generally requires that the user click a button or check a box stating "I accept" or "I agree."
74
 
The systems used to present clickwrap terms are not uniform, but generally display terms in a 
―frame through which a user must scroll to get to a radio button that must be checked to 
proceed.‖75  In some cases, the presentation may include ―terms within a frame and a radio 
button outside and below that frame that must be checked to proceed.‖76  The notice provided, 
not the design or display of the clickwrap window, is dispositive.  The common distinction 
between the various contracting methods has been the affirmative action the clickwrap 
method requires from the consumer.
77
   
 
Although affirmative action must be taken to complete the agreement, a consumer is not 
required to actually read the terms and conditions.  In fact, it is very likely that consumers will 
not read the agreement. In a recent study, an author compared 58 cases where clickwrap 
agreements were litigated.  The author concluded that ―[a]lthough there are legitimate reasons 
for believing that computer users do not truly agree when clicking through electronic license 
agreements, invalidating all of these terms for lack of assent would have significant negative 
effects on electronic commerce.‖78  Therefore, the opportunity to review the agreement 
provides the distinction and provides courts with at least the appearance of contractual 
fairness.  The inclusion of numerous legal terms into electronic contracts has not been without 
criticism.  Some of the most controversial inclusions have been terms ―forbidding public 
criticism of the product, requiring consent to third-party monitoring, prohibiting reverse 
engineering, prohibiting use in connection with third-party software, requiring consent to 
future revisions of the agreement (which is subject to change without notice), disclaiming 
warranties, and disclaiming liabilities.‖79   
 
                                                 
74
 See e.g. Moore v. Microsoft Corp., 741 N.Y.S 2d 91 (2002). 
75
 Mann, Ronald J. and Siebeneicher, Travis, JUST ONE CLICK: THE REALITY OF INTERNET RETAIL 
CONTRACTING,108 Colum. L. Rev. 984, 990 (2008). 
76
 Id. 
77
Mann and Siebeneicher, at 984 (2008). 
78
 Id. at 998. 
79
 Davis, Nathan J., PRESUMED ASSENT: THE JUDICIAL ACCEPTANCE OF CLICKWRAP, 22 Berkeley 
Tech L.J. 577, 578 (2007). 
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In the US, courts have considered and upheld clickwrap agreements since the 1990s.
80
  
American courts have generally held that the presentation of terms provides the consumer 
with reasonable notice.
81
  Regardless of what often appears to be a judicial endorsement of 
clickwrap, some courts have been less willing to accept clickwrap agreements.  Although the 
substances of the terms delivered via ―clickwrap‖ have been successfully challenged, the 
method of delivery is generally considered to be legally sound.  For example, in the State of 
New York, a court refused to enforce a forum-selection clause entered into by clickwrap 
license.
82
  However, the New York Court's decision to invalidate the agreement was based on 
its determination that the terms of the agreement were in violation of state public policy rather 
than a deficiency in the clickwrap method of delivery.
83
 
2.5 Browser settings as a means of providing consent 
The Internet continues to challenge the way we apply traditional legal terms like acceptance 
or consent.  When consumers visit web pages websites will often request to install ―cookies,‖ 
on the consumer’s browser.84  Consumers have the ability to pre-set their Internet browser to 
accept or reject the installation of cookies on their computers.  If the browser is set to ―accept 
all cookies,‖ which is the default setting of all major Internet browsers, acceptance of cookies 
takes place automatically.   As a result, ―a different class of consent has emerged…where the 
action underlying the alleged consent is taken not by a human but by a computer.‖85   
The practice of browser led acceptance has been generally accepted in the US.  Default 
acceptance of cookies is currently the general business practice in the EU.
86
  Until recently, 
default acceptance, expressed in browser settings, was thought to be consistent with the 
directive on privacy and electronic communications 2002/58 (hereinafter ―ePrivacy‖ 
                                                 
80
 Hotmail Corp. v. Van$ Money Pie, Inc., No., 1998 WL 388389 (N.D. Cal.1998). See also CompuServe, Inc. v. 
Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1260-61 (6th Cir. 1996). 
81
 CompuServe, 89 F.3d at. 1260-61.  See also Alces and Greenfield, at ¶ 1102-06 (2010). 
82
 Scarcella v. Am. Online, No. 1168/04, 2004 WL 2093429 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. Sept. 8, 2004).  
83
 Id. 
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 ―Cookies‖ discussed Infra at § 3.6. 
85
 Oppenheimer, at 9 (2010). 
86
 Eecke et al., RECENT EVENTS IN EU INTERNET LAW—EUROPE,14 No. 3 Internet L. 25, 25 (2010). 
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directive).
87
 However, a regulatory opinion by the Working Party suggests that this practice 
does not obtain proper consent, pursuant to EU law.
88
  The Working Party contends that, 
pursuant to Article 2(h) of Directive 95/46/EC, consent provided as a default browser setting 
will not be considered valid.
89
  As has been noted by the Working Party ―[a]verage data 
subjects are not aware of the tracking of their online behavior, the purposes of the tracking, 
etc.‖90  As a result, the browser method of consent undertaken solely by a computer may be 
short-lived in the EU. In the US, it has not been problematic for the purposes of accepting 
cookies, which may be used for behavioral advertising purposes.
91
   
2.6 Acceptance of online terms: consent 
In the previous sections the various methods of presenting terms for review by consumers 
were considered.  In this section, I will consider some of the standard types of agreements 
governing privacy terms.  I will also discuss the agreements and consider how they are 
presented.   
A core question that must be addressed in the presentation of the terms is whether the terms 
actually provide consumers with enough information that the consumer is able to provide 
consent.
92
  Consent falls into two general categories.  ―If it is clearly and un-mistakably 
stated, it is referred to as express consent, while if it must be inferred from conduct, it is 
referred to as implied consent.‖93 Therefore, for consent to be valid, affirmative action is not 
always necessary.
94
  In some circumstances, silence may be appropriate.
95
  Although courts 
                                                 
87
 EC Directive on privacy and electronic communications (2002) – Directive 2002/58/EC of 12 July 2002. 
88
 Id. Eecke et al., at 25 (2010)(Providing certain conditions that must be met for acceptance by browser 
settings). 
89
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and legislators generally seem to favor the presentation of terms in the clickwrap variety, as 
we have seen through case law, at least in the US, the method used to present the terms is not 
necessarily dispositive.  To be valid, "[c]onsent requires a knowing understanding of what one 
is doing in a context in which it is actually possible for one to do otherwise, and an 
affirmative action in doing something, rather than a merely passive acquiescence in accepting 
something."
96
   
Therefore, it has been noted that "[a] well-advised website designer would require some 
affirmative action from the user, indicative of assent to the document in question, in order to 
reliably produce a binding contract."
97
  Acceptance or authorization can take place as an 
action and formalities are not required.
98
  As a general rule in American jurisprudence, the 
cases where courts will most likely refuse to enforce a contract in favor of a business are 
those ―where the user was not required to assent to the terms or was asked to consent to the 
terms only after he downloaded the product.‖99  Therefore, businesses that fail to present 
terms to consumers before an agreement takes place, or change terms after an agreement is 
finished, run the risk of having those terms held unenforceable.   
Due to the shape of modern agreements, it is often difficult to present terms in this regard.  
Many agreements consumers enter into are with multiple parties, which may each have their 
own terms and privacy policies.  It is therefore often difficult to determine what the terms are, 
if a privacy policy has changed, or exactly what the terms require.  In the following sections 
of this chapter, I will consider some of these agreements individually, and discuss their impact 
on consent. 
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 Id.  
96
 Margaret Jane Radin, HUMANS, COMPUTERS, AND BINDING COMMITMENT, 75 Ind. L.J. 1126 
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2.6.1 Privacy Policies 
The breadth of privacy a consumer waives when using a website is not always clear to the 
user.
100
  Like contracts, privacy policies are often written in a "standard" form and do not 
provide consumers with an opportunity to negotiate individual terms.
101
  For consumers, it is 
not always clear what the policy includes, particularly when the consumer is dealing with 
multiple parties.  Unlike many contractual agreements, privacy policies often do not require 
that a customer ―click-through‖ or assent to specific terms.102  As a result, consumers may not 
be actively put on notice of the terms of an agreement.  If visiting a website, or use of an 
online service requires the assent to multiple privacy policies, it may be difficult for a 
consumer to locate all of the agreements.  For example, a consumer may agree to the privacy 
policy of a website publisher, and in doing so, be subject to the privacy policies of ad services 
displayed on the website and terms of third-party software providers.  Many privacy experts 
assert that complex privacy policies contained in a single document do not provide effective 
information regarding privacy practices.
103
  Finding the statements, combining the terms, and 
understanding their implications are an onerous task for consumers.  
 
Although privacy policies may impact consumers in much the same way they are impacted by 
contract terms, presentation of the policies often fails to meet standards, which are generally 
considered acceptable in online contracting.
104
  The contracting method of presenting terms to 
the consumer, and then requiring affirmative acceptance, is not always followed.
105
  For 
example, privacy policies often contain terms that allow the company to change user data 
standards at anytime and do not required additional notice or consumer consent.
106
  Web site 
privacy policies often utilize ―browsewrap‖ technology, require that the consumer find 
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applicable terms and conditions on another webpage, and do not require affirmative 
confirmation, or "clickwrap" assent of privacy terms by a consumer.
107
   
 
For many companies, it is preferable to keep the privacy policy outside of the contractual 
agreement.
108
  As noted in one study, ―[t]he retailer gains little or nothing from making a 
privacy policy binding, because the typical privacy policy consists solely of representations 
and commitments by the retailer as to the collection, use, and protection of information.‖109  
From the prospective of legal risk management, by presenting a privacy policy separately, and 
keeping it outside of the contractual agreement has certain advantages for a behavioral 
advertisers or publishers.
110
  If the terms of the agreement are not contractual, the business is 
not bound by the agreement, thus it retains a greater level of flexibility to later make changes 
to terms without seeking consent from the consumer.  Furthermore, potential liability may 
also be limited as a ―breach of contract‖ action based on the privacy policy as a contract 
between the parties, will be unavailable to the consumer.
111
 
2.6.2 End User License Agreements  
End user license agreements (EULAs) are often presented to consumers making online 
purchases.  The agreements are often presented as a means of protecting the intellectual 
property rights of a third-party.  The EULA process is often as follows:   
A buyer purchases software in a shrink-wrapped box or--as is now routine--by 
downloading it online; a standard form contract is inside the box (a shrink-wrap 
EULA) or displayed on a splash screen during installation (a clickwrap EULA). No 
negotiation is allowed; by the time the buyer can read the agreement the only options 
are to return the software or accept the terms. When return is not a meaningful option, 
acquiescence is the only alternative.112 
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In this situation, buyers have very little bargaining power to oppose terms they may deem 
unfair.
113
  Courts have upheld the EULA practice as applicable in B2C transactions.
114
  In the 
US, EULAs are often considered to be more ―pro-seller‖ than the rules applicable by default 
pursuant to the Uniform Commercial Code.
115
  If multiple parties are involved, it can be 
difficult for a consumer to determine which party they are entering into an agreement with.  
Consumer advocates often argue that EULAs do not provide consumers with proper notice of 
terms governing the agreement. 
2.6.3 Terms of Use Agreements (TOUs) 
In addition to the terms presented in the contract, and agreements governing interactions with 
third-parties, consumers may be bound with additional terms.  Terms of use agreements 
(hereinafter ―TOU agreements‖ or ―TOUs‖) are agreements governing the use of websites or 
web-based services.
116
  TOU agreements are often presented on a browsewrap rather than a 
clickwrap basis.  TOUs are available primarily on a passive basis and do not require 
affirmative assent by the consumer in accepting the terms.
117
   
To determine the rules applicable in a TOU agreement, the consumer is often required to 
follow hyperlinks to another website where the rules governing use are provided.
118
  As a 
result of the myriad of steps for the consumer, TOUs agreements are rarely read.
119
  As noted 
by one commentator ―[w]eb site owners may--and do--exploit this fact to impose terms that 
unacceptably compromise a visitor's privacy.‖120  TOUs agreements often contain provisions, 
which provide the necessary authorization for allowing businesses to collect information from 
                                                 
113
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visitors.
121
  Traditionally, TOU agreements have been deemed an acceptable means to justify 
the collection of consumer data by US courts.
122
   
In the past, US courts have provided some acceptance of allowing companies to change or 
shift privacy policies.  The test applied has generally been that of the Specht Court, discussed 
Supra.  Namely, if a consumer has a reasonable opportunity to inspect terms, the terms may 
potentially bind the user.  However, some recent decisions have added some question marks 
around the TOU practice.  In Harris v. Blockbuster Inc.
123
, the Court refused to uphold a TOU 
agreement, which was presented in clickwrap format, that allowed the company ―at its sole 
discretion and at any time‖ to modify the terms of the agreement.124  The Harris Court held 
the terms of the contract, which in essence only bound the consumer, were illusory and 
unenforceable.
125
  This case shows that some unilateral terms will not be acceptable, even in 
the US where consumers are given wide latitude in accepting terms.  In the US there is a 
requirement of consideration, or a bargained for exchange, which requires parties to exchange 
a benefit for a detriment when forming a contract.
126
  If only one party is bound by the terms, 
this requirement will not be met.
127
  Another issue in Harris is the right at stake.  In that case, 
the terms shifted were not in regards to a behavioral advertising policy.  Rather, they 
concerned certain consumer rights for adjudication of claims in a court.  Furthermore, the 
decision was by a federal district court, which is subject to appeal in an appeals court.  
In the previous section I discussed the different types of agreements wherein privacy policies 
are presented.  As noted in each section, agreements providing the legal basis for behavioral 
advertising policies, which do not require affirmative consent, have been widely accepted by 
courts. In this section, I will discuss specific regulatory efforts taken to police the agreements. 
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In the US, a consumer wishing to void, or defend themselves against enforcement of an 
agreement may assert several defenses including the doctrine of unconsionability or argue that 
the contract is illusory or based on surprise contract terms.  However, these defenses are 
limited and avoiding a contract based on these defenses requires consumers to meet a high 
burden.
128
  As a result, there have been suggestions in the US that changes should be made to 
police, or control, the current tracking of consumers.  Consumer rights advocates maintain 
that current system offers consumers too few options.  Of the options available to consumers, 
they provide little relief.   As suggested by one author, current assumption by legislators and 
industry ―that consent in the form of a EULA clickwrap is sufficient to legitimize the practice 
of indefinite online surveillance‖ should be challenged.129  The author maintains that the 
privacy concerns at stake call into question the application of the contract doctrine of the 
―bargain of software in exchange for indefinite surveillance.‖130  In the EU, regulators have 
limited what consumer can accept in other areas as a result of public policy concerns.  In the 
UTCCD, blacklisted terms represent a policy decision.  Although there is no prohibition on 
behavioral advertising, the state has made a decision that in all circumstances, certain terms 
will be unenforceable.  A similar approach could be taken in both the EU and the US to limit 
blanket and essentially unlimited long-term surveillance of consumers.  
From a legal point of view, it can be argued that consent has either been obtained, or it has 
not.  Under current legal norms, consumers are bound by terms they blindly accept, even if 
the result is sometimes harsh.  However, at the same time, courts have been unwilling to 
enforce agreements that fail to meet a minimal level of consent, particularly if the terms are 
unfair or have a harsh result for the consumer.  In the next section I will present a case, 
regarding a behavioral advertising system, which illustrates this dynamic. 
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2.7 Presentation of BA terms, the case of Sears Inc. 
In the US, a company omitting material terms in consumer agreement may face regulatory 
action for engaging in a deceptive trade practice.
131
  The FTC has the obligation to prevent 
―unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce‖ in the US.132  If the FTC 
suspects unfair or deceptive practices are taking place, it may issue a ―cease and desist‖ order 
and stop the offending conduct.
133
  In recent years, the FTC has increased its enforcement 
against companies violating deceptive trade practice laws on the Internet.
134
  The following 
case is an example of one such enforcement.  
 
In September of 2009, the FTC issued a complaint against Sears Holdings Management 
Corporation Inc. ("Sears") for alleged violations of US federal law with its use of tracking 
applications.
135
  In the Sears case, the FTC alleged that a software application Sears installed 
on its customer's computers allowed the company to track the online behavior of its 
consumers on and off the company’s website.136   The tracking by Sears included interactions 
with ―third-party websites shopping carts, and online accounts, and headers of web-based 
email.‖137 The information was then transmitted back to servers maintained by Sears for 
advertising and marketing purposes.
138
   
 
In the Sears case, the information collected was not limited to interactions on Sears's 
homepage and also recorded information from online banking sessions, email and instant 
messages, and other consumer activities, some of which occurred during "secure" web 
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sessions.
139
  The FTC did not determine whether the underlying Sears contract was 
enforceable.  However, the FTC asserted that the actions of Sears were unfair or deceptive as 
they related to its behavioral advertising practices.
140
  For Sears, the terms disclosed in its 
Privacy Statement and User License Agreement (―PSULA‖) failed to adequately provide the 
consumer with necessary information regarding the type of data it would collect.  The FTC 
charged ―that (1) the company's initial invitation email stating that the software would track 
online browsing was inadequate, (2) the full disclosure of the scope of tracking was buried in 
the 75th line of the PSULA, (3) the installation box did not disclose the scope of the tracking 
application, and (4) the company failed to provide any desktop tray icons or other signs to 
indicate the running of the application on computers.‖141 
 
The FTC action was in many ways unexpected.
142
  Sears was essentially compliant with what 
had been considered a relatively safe and settled business practice in the US, namely, 
clickwrap assent.   As one author noted ―[i]n most respects, Sears did what nearly fifteen 
years of legal decisions, with only a few exceptions, have indicated make an enforceable 
online contract and privacy policy, namely, that the consumer is given a reasonable 
opportunity to review the terms of the agreement and that the user indicates assent to the 
agreement.‖143  The action by the FTC may require businesses to reconsider legal aspects of 
contracting as it relates to the terms governing privacy.
144
   For example, in the settlement, 
Sears was required to take additional steps in protecting consumer privacy as a result of the 
earlier violation.  If Sears deploys similar behavioral advertising devices in the future, it must 
disclose information regarding the tracking order ―clearly and prominently‖ and on a separate 
screen from any ―end user license agreement, privacy policy, terms of use page, or similar 
document.‖145 Sears was also required to clearly provide all the information that the tracking 
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application would monitor.
146
  The order also provides that Sears must ―[o]btain express 
consent from the consumer to the download or installation of the tracking application.‖147    
 
The case of Sears gives some credence to the argument that the display of terms to 
consumers, particularly in Browsewrap format, is insufficient.
148
  The tracking application 
Sears’s customers downloaded was extremely invasive and the information it collected was 
extremely broad.  However, the methods used were not new, in fact, the result of this case 
was a surprise for many.
149
  What is important to learn from the Sears case is what it says 
about the lack of regulation governing behavioral advertising in the US.  The FTC 
intervention was successful because Sears essentially buried the description of the 
application’s functions on ―the 75th line down in the scroll box.‖150  The disclosure of what 
the product did was insufficient.  However, the tracking itself, absent the failed disclosure and 
unfair dealing, was not particularly problematic under US law.  It is also important to 
recognize that a ―fly-by-night‖ company did not take this action. Rather, Sears is a 
mainstream business and was not operating at a standard far from what is currently considered 
acceptable in the US.
151
  Based on the current regulatory landscape, had the terms disclosing 
the tracking application been more prominently displayed, and the functions of the tracking 
application fully described, the tracking system would have likely escaped regulation.  
Therefore, Sears tells us that although there are some protections for consumers, in 
particularly outrageous or extreme cases, as a whole, the lack of regulation in the US leaves 
businesses with wide latitude to deploy behavioral advertising technologies in online 
agreements.
152
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2.8 Limits to consent 
The discussion of the Sears action in the previous section shows that although companies 
have wide latitude in applying terms in EULAs, privacy policies, and TOUs agreements, there 
are limits to what will be considered acceptable by regulators in the US.
153
  However, in the 
US, it has been argued that those remedies are far too limited.  However, fears of stagnating 
innovation, and ultimately commerce, often hinder steps towards reform. 
 
In the EU, when enacting laws relating to electronic commerce and online contracting, 
regulators have built in a much greater level of consumer protection.  In the EU, ―regulators 
have been expanding their oversight…at precisely the time that US contract law has turned 
away from public regulatory models.‖154  For example, directives like the UTCCD, which 
provided a list of banned or ―blacklisted terms‖ represent a policy decision in the EU.155  
Although there is no prohibition on behavioral advertising, contract terms deemed unfair will 
not be enforced in the EU.
156
  A similar approach could be taken in both the EU and the US to 
limit blanket and essentially unlimited long-term surveillance of consumers.  However, unlike 
the US, consumers in the EU have specific set of directives aimed at consumer protection. As 
a result, EU consumers have some remedies for unfair dealings, including those in behavioral 
advertising context.  Although the Sears case suggests that some methods of disclosure will 
not be enforceable, the protection is reactionary, and therefore it does little to protect 
consumers before a problem occurs.  
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3 Behavioral advertising; law, regulation, 
and the role of contracts and consent. 
3.1 Overview and Scope 
I will begin this chapter with a discussion of behavioral advertising and some of the 
technologies used to track online consumer behavior.  The point of focus will be the legal 
impact of technology, rather than a discussion of technological capabilities. I will further 
consider the current regulation of behavioral advertising in the EU and the US.  I will 
specifically discuss recent regulatory principles advocated by the FTC and the Working Party.  
In addition to discussion regarding existing regulations, I will also consider current voids in it 
regulation of behavioral advertising.
157
  I will compare the systems in place in the US and the 
EU, and discuss strengths and weaknesses in the current systems.   
Finally I will discuss some of current causes of action and remedies available to consumers 
for violations of their privacy. The discussion will touch on damages consumers suffer as a 
result of lost or reduced privacy. In addition to case examples, I will discuss a specific case 
from the US showing some of the limits of data anonymization as a method of protecting 
consumer privacy.  Next, I will compare the existing systems of regulation and provide some 
commentary on whether the US or the EU is dealing with the challenges presented by 
behavioral advertising in a more effective manner, from the perspective of the consumer.  
Finally, I will consider whether behavioral advertising ought to be regulated to a greater 
extent in either the US or the EU.  
3.2 Behavioral advertising: background 
The purpose of behavioral advertising is to deliver more effective advertisements to 
consumers.
158
  Behavioral advertisers use various technologies to collect information on 
consumer’s online behavior including cookies, adware, and deep-packet inspection.  Based on 
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the information collected, a consumer profile can be created.  The consumer profile is 
designed to provide advertisers with a more accurate picture of the kinds of services or 
products that a user, or a group of users, might be interested in purchasing.
159
  The end goal of 
the data collection, analysis, and application is to deliver the most relevant advertisements to 
each user.
160
  It is also clear that companies across many sectors of commerce are interested in 
behavioral advertising as a method of increasing sales.  Spending on online advertising has 
risen dramatically in recent years, from $6 billion in 2002 to over $16.6 billion in 2006.
161
  As 
one expert in the field succinctly stated "[t]his dream of perfect 'targeted' or 'behavioral' 
advertising is currently both the Next Big Thing for commerce and for funding of 'Web 2.0' 
businesses, but also one of the greatest potential threats we currently have to individual 
privacy."
162
   
 
As a result of digitalization, huge amounts of data can now be collected, stored, and searched 
for a relatively low cost.
163
  Conducting the same process via paper or analog technology 
would be prohibitively expensive.
164
  As technologies continue to improve, so does amount of 
data collected.   At the same time advertising provider’s ability to collect and utilize data has 
increased, so has the number of Internet users.  As of 2009, almost a quarter of the world’s 
population has used the Internet.
165
  As a result, online advertising continues to reach a greater 
percentage of the population.
166
  One company, Revenue Science Inc., maintains that it is able 
to track ―billions of behaviors per day from more than 100 million unique users.‖167 The ad 
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agency DoubleClick, Inc., a leading behavioral advertiser claims to have sent more than 60 
billion advertisements in a single month.
168
 
3.3 Parties involved in behavioral advertising  
In this next section, I will consider the parties involved in behavioral advertising, and briefly 
discuss their roles in the process.  Entities that produce online content, such as news websites 
or even bloggers are deemed ―publishers.‖169  Like their offline counterparts, online 
publishers sell space for the placement of advertisements.
170
  Publishers use advertising 
revenue to fund the creation of new products or services.  The space made available by 
publishers, often in the form of web-banners or headers, is rented to intermediaries, often ―ad 
agencies‖ or online marketers, for advertising purposes.171  Ad agencies then sell 
advertisements to companies and place ads in the ―banners‖ or other space they have rented 
from the publishers.
172
  Ad agencies employ behavioral advertising technologies to sell more 
effective, and thus, more valuable ad space.  Advertising is considered more effective if it 
produces a higher ―click through rate‖ or more consumer views.173  DoubleClick, Inc., one of 
the largest behavioral advertising providers, contracted with over 11,000 various websites to 
provide them with "banner advertisements."
174
 
3.4 Profiling approaches 
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Profiling and digital targeting is not a new phenomenon.
175
  The first behavioral 
advertisements focused on the content of individual websites to deliver advertisements.
176
  
For example, a news story on housing might also contain bank advertisements for loans.  
Initially, assumptions on readership were made based on the content of the publication.  The 
advertiser did not explore whether the reader was interested in buying a house, selling a 
house, or potentially taking part in an investment opportunity.  Although the first behavioral 
advertising methods were met with some success, this ―spray and pray‖ method lacked the 
specificity of current ad systems.
177
  Although web 1.0 methods had some success, they had 
―inadequate user data and context upon which to judge consumer interests.‖178  
New behavioral advertising technologies are ―user-centric‖ rather than ―site-centric.‖179  
Instead of focusing on website content, the technologies focus on the individual user.
180
  
Businesses and marketing companies use available tools to collect information about online 
users including cookies, geographic location, click-stream data, and computer type.
181
  By 
combining the information they gleam from these sources, behavioral advertisers can create a 
more relevant profile of an individual user or even a group of users.
182
  In the housing 
example above, the advertiser could combine the earlier search terms, along with geographic 
location, for clues regarding the consumer’s visit.  Although the computer might have 
multiple users, knowing that someone at that computer conducted multiple searches for 
―housing styles‖ rather that ―housing loans‖ is arguably valuable information for an 
advertiser.  
The question often raised is what is the harm?  Advertisers maintain that their service 
provides consumers with a benefit.  If the consumer agreed to the tracking by contract, and 
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the data is made anonymous, advertisers often argue that no specific harm is taking place.  
Regardless of the technologies employed, consumers would be delivered advertisements 
while accessing a publisher's service.  With the second-generation technologies, at least 
consumers are provided with information that is potentially of interest to them.  In this chapter 
I will consider and examine the logic behind this argument.  Specifically, I will consider the 
limits of anonymity in advertising systems, and consider some of the resulting consequences 
when they fail.   
The EU's omnibus approach to data protection provides consumers in the EU with a high 
minimum standard of protection.  Member states are given a measure of discretion in the 
adoption and adaptation of EU directives; however, they are unable provide protection below 
a minimum standard.
183
  The minimum level of protection set by the directive essentially 
serves as the floor or base level of consumer protection, which member states cannot drop 
below.  Although the individual directives are designed to be comprehensive and work across 
multiple sectors, applicable obligations may vary from directive to directive.  As a result, 
while certain activity may be permitted under one directive, another directive may prohibit the 
same activity.  Therefore, ad providers must consider the mesh of regulation, and not rely 
exclusively on a single regulation.   
3.5 Scope of tracking technologies considered 
In this section, I will discuss some of the technologies used by behavioral advertisers.  I will 
explain the principles of the technologies, and provide how regulations in place are applicable 
to them.  As a preliminary matter, it is well documented that consumer information may be 
illegally collected by technologies such as "spyware.‖184 However, illegal technologies will 
not be the focus of this thesis.
185
  The discussion in this thesis is based on lawfully deployed 
technologies, that is, with consent of the consumer.  Although I may question the presentation 
of terms, or the method in which the consent is obtained, I do not contend that behavioral 
advertising technologies should be treated in the same manner as spyware or viruses, which 
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are generally deployed without any notice to the user.
186
  Legislative instruments, like the 
ePrivacy directive, have put into place prohibitions against deployment of unlawful 
activity.
187
 As a point of departure, behavioral advertising software or adware is installed on a 
computer for marketing purposes, not to destroy programs, discover credit card information, 
or commit criminal acts.
188
     
Tracking of consumers on the web has rapidly evolved from systems capable of collecting 
information based on an individual website visited, to systems capable of tracking complete 
web usage by a consumer.  In this section I will discuss well-established technologies such as 
cookies, which are used to facilitate the behavioral advertising process.  Additionally, I will 
consider application and operation of new and future technologies, such as deep packet 
inspection (hereinafter ―DPI‖).  By considering DPI, a better picture of how the current 
systems in the US and EU will be able to react to and regulate more advanced behavioral 
advertising technologies.  By comparing the current and next generation behavioral 
advertising technologies, we can better evaluate the effectiveness of regulatory proposals 
made in the US and the EU.  
3.6 Cookies 
Behavioral targeting technologies utilize ―cookies‖ which allow a website to recognize a 
particular user when they visit.
189
  Cookies are small text files, which are placed on a user’s 
hard drive and are recognized by a particular website.
190
  The amount of information retained 
varies and may include anything from shopping cart contents to the users Internet Protocol 
(IP) address or credit card number.
191
  Cookies have many legitimate uses in electronic 
commerce, and the length of time a cookie remains active on a user’s computer varies.192  
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―Session cookies‖ only remain active during a specific user session on a website and contain 
no memory past the initial visit.
193
 ―Persistent cookies‖ stay on a user’s computer for multiple 
sessions and allow the website to recognize the user during future visits.
194
   
Some cookies are deposited on consumers by an individual website, but are recognizable by 
members of an advertising network.  If, for example, if a user visits iTunes,
195
 a cookie is 
deposited so that iTunes will remember the visitor in the future.  This is a ―second-party‖ 
cookie.  If iTunes is partnered with an advertising provider like DoubleClick, an advertising 
cookie will also be deposited on the user's hard drive.  The DoubleClick cookie is of the 
"third-party" variety.
196
    The result is that DoubleClick, a behavioral advertiser, can follow 
the user and track purchases on ITunes, in addition to other member sites by using the cookie 
technology.  By storing information gathered across multiple partners’ websites, more 
information is collected than would be possible from any single member.
197
   
As with many behavioral advertising applications, consumers are often unfamiliar with the 
technology being used.  In a recent study, consumers were asked, "if you use a computer, 
have you ever heard of an online technology known as cookies?"
198
  The result was that 60% 
of percent of the respondents had not heard of cookies.
199
  Of those respondents who had 
heard of cookies, 25% incorrectly stated their function.
200
  Arguably, consumers have some 
control over cookies, that is, consumers may refuse to accept them if they wish.  As discussed 
Supra, consumers may block cookies by browser settings.  However, the fact that most 
consumers are unaware that the technologies exist, suggests that consumers may not be 
effective in taking proactive steps to block behavioral advertising technologies. 
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Cookies have become a well-established part of consumer web usage.  Although cookie 
technologies may not be widely recognized by the consumers using them, regulators, 
particularly in the EU, have considered the role of cookies and other such technologies and 
their potential negative impact on consumer privacy.  In the next section, I will discuss a 
technology that is new and is poised to strain the limits of some legislation currently in place 
in both the US and the EU.  
3.7 Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) technology 
DPI technology is a platform used to provide behavioral advertising to online consumers.
201
 
The technology allows Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to collect all Internet 
communications by an individual user.
202
  Unlike other types of behavioral technology, DPI 
intercepts web traffic from all websites visited, and can be used to create much broader 
profiles.
203
  The information gathered by DPI is not limited by the websites an individual 
visits.
204
  Because the technology essentially intercepts communications, the user is often 
unaware that profiling is taking place.  A browser set to reject cookies will not limit DPI 
tracking, because cookies are not used. 
From a contractual perspective, the consumer consents to DPI monitoring via service contract 
with an ISP.  When a consumer signs up with a provider, they agree to allow the ISP to 
monitor their web use.
205
  The ISP then contracts with a DPI firm to intercept web traffic, 
which is communicated between a consumer and a website.
206
  A critic of the technology 
provided the following DPI analogy: ―[i]t’s like the Post Office opening all of my letters to 
see what I’m interested in, merely so that I can be sent a better class of junk mail.‖207  On 
September 30, 2010 the EC brought action against the UK for ―not fully implementing EU 
rules on the confidentiality of electronic communications such as e-mail or Internet 
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browsing.‖208  No decisions on the use of DPI have been issued by the Working Party; 
however, the WP recently stated that the application of DPI technology in the behavioral 
advertising context ―raises serious legal issues.‖209 There have not been any court decisions 
regarding DPI in the US.
210
  However, it is estimated that 10 % of American Internet users in 
the US have had their browsing monitored by DPI.
211
 
The contractual structure of used to deploy DPI is of interest.  The used of DPI technology 
shows a continuation of the policy of using consent as a method of deploying long-term 
consumer surveillance for advertising purposes.  However, unlike cookies or adware, DPI can 
potentially provide complete surveillance of consumer activity.  Therefore, it is important to 
consider the contractual agreement, and their relation to data protection or other schemes of 
regulation.    
3.8 FTC and Working Party principles 
In the previous sections I discussed the parties involved in behavioral advertising, profiles 
created, and some of the technologies used.  The following section will consider recent 
opinions or and policy statements by regulatory agencies in the US and EU.  Specifically, I 
will consider principles that behavioral advertising companies may follow in order to be 
compliant with applicable law.  
In 2009, the FTC provided a list of non-binding principles or guidelines that behavioral 
advertisers should follow to in order to avoid committing deceptive trade practices.  The FTC 
proposal largely follows the current tradition of self-regulation in the US.
212
  In 2010, as a 
result of concerns regarding behavioral advertising in the EU, the Working Party adopted an 
opinion on the matter.  The Working Party opinion provides points for behavioral advertisers 
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to follow in order to be more compliant with EU data protection law.  Neither the FTC report 
nor the Working Party opinion has the force of law; however, both are considered 
authoritative in their respective jurisdictions.  Unlike the Working Party, the FTC has the 
authority to initiate enforcement actions against companies committing what it deems to 
deceptive or unfair trade practices.
213
  The main principles from the respective agencies are as 
follows: 
FTC:
214
 Article 29 Working Party:
215
 
(1) Transparency and Consumer Control; 
(2) Reasonable Security, and Limited Data 
Retention, for Consumer Data; 
(3) Affirmative Express Consent for Material 
Changes to Existing Privacy Promises; 
(4) Affirmative Express Consent to (or 
Prohibition Against) Using Sensitive Data 
for Behavioral Advertising. 
(1) Limit in time the scope of the consent; 
(2) offer the possibility to revoke consent; 
(3) create visible tools to be displayed where 
the monitoring takes place; 
(4) Create opt-in mechanisms requiring 
affirmative action by the consumer. 
 
The principles provided by the respective agencies will be used as a point of comparison of 
the approaches taken in enforcement in the US and the EU.  There are clearly some common 
principles or points of agreement that exist between the FTC and the Working Party.  When 
comparing the opinions, one of the points stressed by both the regulatory bodies is consumer 
consent.  Although discussion differs, both agencies focus on the need for consumers to have 
a greater level of control over their grant of consent.  Particularly, both agencies emphasize 
the need to for behavioral advertisers to obtain an ―express‖ or ―affirmative‖ grant of consent 
from the consumer before tracking online behavior.  Both groups appear to have concerns 
with the passive nature of the consent by which behavioral advertising technologies are being 
implemented and tracking consumers.   
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As discussed in chapter 2, consumers often fail to read or understand terms of contracts or 
other agreements disclosing behavioral advertising policies.  It is also very difficult for 
consumers to detect tracking systems after they have been installed.
216
  The level of 
sophistication of tracking technologies is difficult to comprehend, even for an expert user.
 217
  
As stated by the Working Party, ―[I]n most cases, individuals are simply unaware that this 
[tracking] is happening.‖218 In addition to more complicated term disclosers, consumer 
protection advocates are also concerned that tracking practices are becoming more 
invasive.
219
  Many consumers do not have the tools to make coherent, informed decisions 
regarding behavioral targeting applications.  Furthermore, the Working Party has challenged 
some of the behavioral targeting practices that were fairly widespread in the EU as being 
incompatible with EU law.
220
   
Although some of the principles are similar, the Working Party opinion stands in stark 
contrast the FTC principles from the point of practical suggestions made to increase consumer 
privacy.
221
    The Working Party makes specific, concrete suggestions to enhance consumer 
protection.  Suggestions like creating ―visible tools to be displayed where the monitoring 
takes place‖ would greatly increase consumer knowledge of the tracking that is occurring.  
Under the current system, in both the EU and the US, once an advertiser achieves consumer 
consent by contract or other agreement, the consumer has very few reminders that the tracking 
continues to take place.  Because the technologies are basically invisible to all but the most 
technologically proficient user, most consumers are unable to determine when their activities 
are essentially being recorded.  Additionally, creating ―opt-in mechanisms requiring 
affirmative action by the consumer‖ would require more affirmative action from the 
consumer.   
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In the EU, after implementation of the ePrivacy directive, member states will allow targeting 
to take place only if the consumer provides adequate consent.
222
  As stated in the Working 
Party opinion, ―[c]onsent must be obtained before the personal data are collected, as a 
necessary measure to ensure that data subjects can fully appreciate that they are consenting, 
and what it is that they are consenting to.
223
  Therefore, pursuant to Article 5(3) of the 
ePrivacy directive, a cookie cannot be lawfully placed on the user’s terminal equipment, 
absent prior consent.  As stated in section 2.5 Supra, according to the Working Party, default 
browser settings fail to provide adequate prior consent.
224
    If the consent is to be informed, 
information about the sending purposes of the cookie must also be provided to the user.  
Under the Working Party principles, even if consent is initially obtained from the consumer, 
the consumer will retain the power to revoke the consent at a later time.  The Working Party 
makes it very clear that uninformed and unspecific grants of consent are inadequate.
225
   
On the other hand, the FTC principles use terms like ―transparency and consumer control.‖226  
As aspirational goals, these ideas sound positive for consumers.  However, the FTC fails to 
objectively define what this means in a meaningful context.  To a consumer seeking greater 
protection, or a behavioral advertiser attempting to be compliant with the law, general goals 
or principles like ―consumer control‖ are difficult to decipher.  For example, in the Sears case 
discussed in chapter 2, would the company’s actions have been transparent, and thus 
compliant with the principles, if the disclosure of behavioral tracking terms were placed on 
the 15
th
 line of the policy rather than the 75
th
?
227
  
In the following sections I will compare the current structures in place governing behavioral 
advertising practices in the EU and the US.  In addition to the direct regulations, I will 
consider the application of consent, incorporation of contract terms, and consumer protections 
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that may be applicable.  I will make references to the Working Party and FTC principles 
where they are applicable. 
3.9 EU regulations 
The EU is home to some of the most comprehensive privacy regulation in the world.  EU 
legislation is aimed at protecting individuals from unauthorized processing of their personal 
data.
228
  EU protections include directives passed on an EU wide level, which must be 
adopted locally by member states.
229
  The scope of the EU regulations I consider will be 
limited to most relevant to behavioral advertising.  Specifically, I will consider how EU 
regulations directed at protecting data work in concert with regulations protecting consumers 
entering into contracts.  I this section I will focus primarily on the Data Protection Directive 
95/46/EC (hereinafter ―DPD‖)230 and the ePrivacy directive.231  Although not yet applicable 
in all jurisdictions, the processing of personal data via Internet services will soon be governed 
by the ePrivacy directive.
232
   
In addition to protections in place under various EU directives, international conventions 
including the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (hereinafter ―ECHR‖) are applicable to data processing in the EU.  Pursuant to 
Article 8 of the ECHR, EU citizens have a fundamental right to a private life.
233
  As a result, 
under the ECHR, private individuals have a cause of action against a state, not private 
individual, for violations stemming from their right to a private life.   
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Any website visited by EU users, which installs cookies on the browser of the EU user, will 
be subject to European data protection and privacy laws.
234
 Therefore, American companies 
providing or utilizing behavioral advertising services to consumers in the EU will be subject 
to the regulations prescribed in the directives.
235
  The starting point for protection under DPD 
is to determine whether the information being provided is personal in nature.
236
  Data 
collected on an anonymous basis will not fall under the DPD.  Although determining whether 
information collected is truly anonymous is not always clear, making data collected 
anonymous is a method used by companies to limit potential liability under the DPD.
237
   
However, simply anonymizing data may no longer be a sufficient measure of protection for 
behavioral advertisers.  Even if ad providers escape some liability under the DPD by making 
data anonymous, in its opinion, the Working Party clearly took issue with the effectiveness of 
anonymization as a means of protecting consumers.  The Working Party asserts that because 
behavioral advertising is based on creating very detailed user profiles, in many cases, the 
profiles will be deemed personal information.  As provided for in Recital 24 of the ePrivacy 
directive ―terminal equipment of users…and any information stored on such equipment are 
part of the private sphere of these users requiring protection under the European Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.‖238  Because behavioral 
advertising employs tracking technologies, the law in the EU places additional requirements 
on the personal information collected.
239
   
Therefore, the information gathered by cookies for behavioral advertising purposes does not 
have to be personal information before it is subject to regulation.
240
  In the context of 
behavioral targeting, the browsing information being collected is from a private sphere, and as 
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such, receives additional and independent legal protection.
241
  Stated differently, whether the 
information collected is personal in nature does not strictly control the law applicable.  
According to the Working Party, simply violating the protected sphere is a sufficient 
violation.  Therefore, the act of collecting the information, regardless of the ultimate content 
obtained is an independent and legally significant violation of privacy according to the 
working party.  
Pursuant to the DPD, data controllers have a much greater level of liability than data 
processors.
242
  However, this is not strictly the case pursuant to the ePrivacy directive.  The 
requirements of article 5(3) of the ePrivacy Directive are applicable ―whether the entity that 
places the cookie is a data controller or a data processor.‖243  Therefore, the ePrivacy directive 
applies to individuals placing cookies, regardless of their use of the equipment.
244
  If the 
behavioral advertiser also processes personal data, they may have additional obligations as a 
controller pursuant to directive 95/45/EC.
245
  Publishers may potentially take on the role of 
controller, depending on the amount of visitor data provided to ad networks, and the 
underlying contractual agreement.
246
  As a result, a company providing behavioral advertising 
services may face liability under multiple directives for the activity.  An entity engaged in 
behavioral advertising may also be required to comply with additional obligations under the 
DPD such as data retention schedule, erasure of data, and rectification of records. 
In addition to obligations presented pursuant to the DPD, liability of an entity creating and 
using tracking applications is readily apparent under the ePrivacy directive.  The recent 
Working Party opinion suggests that in addition to an ad company actively creating profiles 
based on user information, publishers may also have liability.  In the general practice, 
publishers have been thought to have some measure of insulation from liability.  However, the 
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Working Party has determined that even if the publisher’s actions are essentially limited to 
renting out banner space on a website, liability may be incurred.   
Additionally, the Working Party has rejected the approach of providing an ―elaborate‖ privacy 
policy, wherein the most essential information is hidden or difficult to find.
247
  This approach, 
which as discussed in Chapter 2 is relatively common in the US, has been abandoned in favor 
of providing all relevant information in a ―clear and comprehensive manner.‖248 For 
behavioral advertisers this may even include periodically notifying users that monitoring is 
taking place. 
3.10 Opt-out v. Opt-in requirements 
In the EU, the discussion on the whether behavioral advertising technologies should only be 
deployed on an opt-in basis has been going on for some time. 
249
   In the EU, behavioral 
advertisers may track consumers without having them specifically choose to opt-in.
250
 
However, the ePrivacy directive provides that ―consent may still be made conditional on the 
well-informed acceptance of a cookie or similar device…‖.251  
The Working Party has stated that while opt-out policy schemes may provide consumers with 
increased control over their privacy, they are generally insufficient to provide for consent.  
The WP has noted that only in ―very specific, individual cases, could implied consent be 
granted‖ by and op-out system.252  Perhaps users with a certain level of experience with 
behavioral advertising are able to provide consent in this manner.  The WP does not suggest 
that a subjective standard should be applied.  However, it follows that the sufficiency of an 
opt-out program is the exception rather than the rule.  As a result, opt-out programs will rarely 
fulfill the requirement of Article 5(3) of the ePrivacy directive. 
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3.11 Potential causes of action against behavioral 
advertisers: US 
In the previous section I discussed the system of regulation in the EU as it relates to 
behavioral advertising.  In the next section I will consider some of the remedies and causes of 
action currently available in the US for consumers facing violations of privacy rights.  I will 
consider the right to privacy, statutory regulations, and causes of action sounding in tort.   
3.11.1 Right to privacy in the constitutional and common law 
Despite references to the ―right to privacy‖ in political discourse, the US constitution does not 
contain an enumerated right as such.
253
  The United States Supreme Court (US Supreme 
Court) has considered the right to privacy, and has concluded that a right to privacy exists; 
however, the right is narrow in scope and application.  The US Supreme Court has recognized 
a cause of action for violations of privacy against government actors.  The right of action is 
based on ―several fundamental constitutional guarantees,‖ which exist in the Third, Fourth, 
and Fifth amendments to the US constitution.
254
    
As a result, citizens have recourse against government-sanctioned violations of their privacy, 
in limited circumstances, but not those of a private company.
255
  If one private citizen violates 
the rights of another, there are no specific constitutional protections in place.  This does not 
mean that no available cause of action exists for consumers. The common law has recognized 
certain causes of action, generally sounding in tort, for violations of the individual right to 
privacy.
256
  However, the lack of constitutional protections is in contrast with the European 
approach, wherein a right to a private life is recognized.
257
  Although common law has 
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recognized certain causes of action, generally sounding in tort, for violations of the individual 
right to privacy, the right is not constitutionally based.
258
     
3.11.2 Statutorily based causes of action 
The US federal government has also developed certain statutory causes of action for privacy 
violations.   In the US, focus on privacy protections has been on individual sectors of 
commerce.
259
  This approach is in contrast with the EU, which has taken an omnibus or more 
global approach the protection of privacy as a right.  Specifically, the financial sector has been 
the recipient of several such sector specific regulations.  In 1978 the US Congress enacted the 
Right to Financial Privacy act of 1978 (hereinafter ―REPA‖).260 The Bank Secrecy Act was 
enacted in 1970 and provides for consumer protections related to privacy in banking 
transactions.
261
  The Fair Credit Reporting Act, which was enacted in 1970 limits sharing and 
use of certain personal information related to credit.
262
  US federal law also provides 
additional privacy protection for minors.  Pursuant to the Child Online Privacy Protection Act 
(COPPA), websites must obtain parental consent before obtaining personal information 
regarding children.
263
  COPPA essentially provides parents with higher level of control over 
their children’s personal information then they have over their own privacy.   
In addition to the general sector specific regulations, separate protections, including criminal 
penalties are available in the form of wiretapping or surveillance prohibitions.  The Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA), the Wiretap Act, and the Stored 
Communications Privacy Act provide for causes of action against both public and private 
actors.
264
  Although the ECPA was enacted well before the growth modern behavioral 
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advertising, parties have attempted to apply it to violations of privacy rights.  In the US, 
plaintiffs have attempted to bring lawsuits under these sections for what they believed were 
privacy violations online.   
In addition to definitional and conceptual barriers in wiretapping statutes, plaintiffs have 
encountered substantial barriers in showing that the monitoring taking place was without user 
consent.  As discussed in section 2, at some point in the contracting process, whether by 
clickwrap or Browsewrap agreement, consumers generally provide for consent to be 
monitored.
265
  In the US, if a company is able to gain consent, they will avoid enforcement 
under federal laws relating to electronic surveillance.
266
  For example, the Wiretap Act 
provides that "...an adware company that obtained consumer consent to a EULA could argue 
that it is immune from liability because of the consent provision of 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2) 
(d)."
267
  Additionally, many of the statutory provisions protecting consumers in the US are 
based on activities of state actors, such as law enforcement.  Therefore, the protections are ill 
suited for use against private companies intercepting consumer information.
268
  As a result of 
the broad exceptions provided, the protection granted to consumers is minimal.  If a consumer 
consents to the surveillance, the remedies afforded under these statues will be generally 
unavailable. 
Plaintiffs suing advertisers faced this ―consent problem‖ in the case of In re DoubleClick269 
consumers brought causes of actions under the ECPA against behavioral advertising 
companies.  In the case of In re DoubleClick, DoubleClick, a behavioral advertising company, 
admitted to placing ―cookies‖ on the Plaintiffs’ hard drives.  Double-click further admitted 
that cookies, as well as other tracking technologies, monitored the plaintiff activates online 
for the purpose of providing advertisements.  However, the DoubleClick Court held the 
Plaintiffs provided prior consent to the monitoring activities that took place.  Even if the 
consent was provided via the publisher’s website, the consumers consent to a third-party 
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cookie was sufficient.  As a result, Double Click’s surveillance fell outside of the protection 
of the statute.  
In a case with some factual similarity, In re Pharmatrak, Inc., (hereinafter “Pharmatrak‖) the 
plaintiffs brought claims under the ECPA.
270
 In Pharmatrak, the district court followed the 
holding in the DoubleClick and found the consent of the plaintiffs fatal to their claims to their 
cause of action under the ECPA.
271
  However, on appeal, the district courts earlier 
determination was reversed.  The appellate court determined that notice was not provided and 
therefore ―pharmaceutical companies [plaintiffs] did not give the requisite consent.‖272 
Furthermore, the appellate court found the fact that ―[t]he pharmaceutical clients sought and 
received assurances from Pharmatrak that its NET compare service did not and could not 
collect personally identifiable information.‖273  The Court found this assurance, that tracking 
was not taking place, inconsistent with consent to allow tracking.
274
  The Pharmatrak court 
also noted efforts of the defendants and found the invisible nature of the behavioral 
advertising technology, which was by design, provided deficient notice and invalidated any 
implied consent.
275
   
Consumer attempts at litigation under statutory acts, outside of the FTC have been met with 
little success.  Therefore, although the ECPA may be useful in prosecuting unauthorized 
installations, such as the case of spyware, the act has proven difficult to apply in cases where 
consent is a defense.
276
  The Pharmatrak case shows there are some limits to implied consent, 
particularly in cases where a user is told behavioral tracking is not taking place.  However, as 
a whole, the ECPA is of limited utility where consent is obtained in the behavioral advertising 
context.  
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3.11.3 Causes of action based in tort 
In the US, the common law allows for causes of action for invasion of privacy.
277
  However, 
consumers also face challenges in bringing lawsuits against behavioral advertisers under this 
cause of action.  As stated Supra, consumers are often unaware that the tracking practice is 
taking place.  Unlike many consumer lawsuits, where a product malfunctions or an individual 
faces specific and obvious harm, behavioral tracking is not always easy to detect.  If it is 
detected, consent may defeat the consumer claim, as consent is a defense which may be 
available.  If tracking is discovered the consumer will often find it difficult to prove that any 
damage has occurred.  Based on the multiple levels of contracts and end user agreements, it 
may also be difficult for the consumer to determine which party to sue. 
3.12 Impact of behavioral advertising on online anonymity 
Many consumers are unfamiliar with tracking and believe that they are fairly anonymous 
when they are on the Internet.
278
  Often, this is not the case.  When utilizing behavioral 
targeting technologies, companies often attempt to make the user anonymous.   However, the 
information collected is often so detailed that user can be determine individual based on the 
anonymous profile.
279
  If a data breach occurs, and the ―anonymous‖ profiles are made 
available, the effect on consumers may not be substantially different than simply placing their 
name in the public sphere.  For example, in 2006 American On Line (AOL) made public the 
search data for 657,000 of their users in an ―anonymous‖ profile form.280  Based on the 
available search data, the New York Times newspaper was able to identify individual users.   
Profile numbers assigned to AOL users contained search terms on a range of sensitive topics 
including queries on health and medical issues.  From the information made publically 
available, the NYTs indentified a user based on the profile number assigned to protect her 
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identity.  Therefore, the AOL system for anonymity ―was not much of a shield.‖281  From this 
number, the New York Times was able to determine that an over-60 widow in Lilburn, 
Georgia, USA, conducted the searches.
282
  In addition to her sex, age, marital status, and 
geographic location, the Times was able to determine recent searches she made including: 
―numb fingers‖, ―over 60 single men‖ and ―dog that urinates on everything.‖283 In addition to 
searches for products, the subject conducted searches relating to various medical symptoms or 
conditions.
284
   
The above example illustrates that the collection of consumer data has the potential to impact 
consumer privacy.
285
  How information is collected, and the strength of the systems in place 
to protect data, are of import to consumers.  If the profiles created to protect anonymity are 
easily linked to individuals, they do little to protect consumers.  If further shows that 
consenting to behavioral advertising when signing up for a service, without fully 
understanding the agreement, may have potential consequences for the consumer.   
3.13 Regulation: US and EU 
Both the FTC and the Working Party seem to be in agreement that current grants of consent 
by consumers are perhaps overly broad.  They also seem to agree that behavioral advertising 
has the potential to negatively impact consumer privacy.  Based on the increase in 
surveillance, regulatory and advisory bodies in both jurisdictions have reacted.  The practice 
of gaining consumer consent, via a contract or browsewrap agreement, and then almost 
indefinitely providing surveillance is a recognized problem in both the US and the EU.  
However, when you compare the systems, the similarities between the approaches to 
regulation diverge quickly.   
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The EU system provides for a much higher level of consumer protection on multiple levels. In 
addition to contractual based protections, the ePrivacy directive and the DPD provide 
consumers with greater levels of protection over their information even after they agree to 
having it collected.
286
  The Working Party has also taken a very consumer orientated approach 
in its interpretations of regulations.  In the US, regulations are not as protective of consumers.  
Consumers have very few protections when agreements are being formed.  For a consumer to 
escape enforcement of a term, they must generally show that the terms of the agreement are 
unconscionable and in some way ―shock the conscious,‖ are ―surprise or unexpected,‖ or 
should be void or for public policy reasons.  In the US, the post-contractual US rights also 
have a very high standard of proof, and thus, are difficult to utilize for consumers.  As seen in 
the AOL searcher example above, the failure to provide regulation and allowing profiling to 
take place, has an impact on consumer privacy.   
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4 Conclusion 
In this thesis, I considered the role of contracts and other agreements used to legitimize 
behavioral advertising technologies.  I maintain that online contracts, privacy policies, and 
TOUs agreements generally provide consumers with insufficient information to consent to 
behavioral advertising.  The grant of authority provided in the agreements is often much 
broader than is understood by the consumer.  Additionally, tracking technologies are more 
invasive than consumers are generally aware of and also track the consumer for long periods 
of time.  The methods used to gain consumer assent, particularly browsewrap agreements, do 
not provide consumers with sufficient notice of the terms to which they are agreeing.  
Comparing regulatory systems, the EU provides much a higher level of consumer protection 
when entering into agreements. By barring certain terms and allowing for post-contractual 
reformation of contracts, the EU provides consumers with a greater level of protection when 
entering into an agreement.  The gap in protection is particularly prominent in the US.  The 
common law, and modified statutory law where applicable, provide consumers with very little 
protection either in accepting the agreements or post-contractual rights to reform agreements.  
The reactionary system of consumer protection also fails to provide protection until after a 
problem has occurred.  Unlike the EU, the US system provides consumers with too few tools 
when entering into online agreements. 
When considering the systems governing behavioral advertising, the EU has a much more 
complete system to protect consumers.  A major weakness with the US system, in addition to 
the absence of direct regulation, is overly broad consent exceptions in the few statutory 
protections that do exist.  Stated differently, the consent exceptions swallow up any protection 
the statutory regulations might have provided.  The EU system of providing consumers with 
protection at the contracting stage on the front end, and requiring higher levels of consumer 
protection once data has been collected, provides consumers with a much higher level of 
overall protection.  I have considered the policies put forth by the Working Party and 
compared them to those of the FTC.  It is my opinion that the EU system is moving further 
into the ―fine-tuning‖ phase of behavioral advertising regulation while the US is still 
attempting to establish the ground floor.  The current trends in spending on online ads suggest 
that behavioral advertising will be with us for some time to come. The EU system is in a 
better position to adapt to future challenges which will be posed by technologies like DPI.   
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